I he publics of different societies are characterized by durable cultural orientations that have major political and economic consequences. Throughout the period from 1973 to 1987, given nationalities consistently showed relative high or low levels of a "civic culture"-a coherent syndrome of personal life satisfaction, political satisfaction, interpersonal trust and support for the existing social order. Those societies that rank high on this syndrome are much likelier to be stable democracies than those that rank low. Economic development and cultural change are linked in a complex pattern of reciprocal influence. Originally, Protestantism may have facilitated the rise of capitalism, leading to economic development, which in turn favored the emergence of the civic culture. But in those countries that attained high levels of prosperity, there eventually emerged postmaterialist values that tended to neutralize the emphasis on economic accumulation that earlier characterized Protestant societies.
It is time to
redress the balance in social analysis. Since the late 1960s, rational choice models based on economic variables have become the dominant mode of analysis; while cultural factors have been deemphasized to an unrealistic degree. This approach has made major contributions to our understanding of how politics works; nevertheless, it underestimates the significance of cultural factors, if only because while economic indicators are readily available for these models, cultural data generally are not.
The incompleteness of models that ignore cultural factors is becoming increasingly evident. In Catholic societies from Latin America to Poland, the church plays a major role despite the demise often predicted by economic determinists. In the Islamic world, Muslim fundamentalism has become a political factor that neither East nor West can ignore. The Confucian-influenced zone of East Asia manifests an economic dynamism that outstrips any other region of the world. By economic criteria one of the leastfavored regions on earth, it is virtually impossible to explain its performance without reference to cultural factors. Even in advanced industrial societies religion not only outweighs social class as an influence on electoral behavior (Lijphart 1979 ) but actually seems to be widening its lead: while social class voting has declined markedly in recent decades, religious cleavages remain astonishingly durable.
There is no question that economic factors are politically important, but they are only part of the story. I argue that different societies are characterized to very different degrees by a specific syndrome of political cultural attitudes; that these cultural differences are relatively enduring, but not immutable; and that they have major political consequences, being closely linked to the viability of democratic institutions.
After flourishing in the 1960s, the con-cept of political culture came under attack. In 1963 the fountainhead of political culture research, Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture, represented a tremendous advance. Previous works that attempted to deal with the impact of culture on politics relied on impressionistic evidence. Cultural influences on the distinctive political behavior of a given people were interpreted in terms of vague but presumably indelible characteristics such as "national character." By providing a well-developed theory of political culture based on cross-national empirical data, Almond and Verba moved from the realm of literary impressions to that of testable propositions. In subsequent years, it was often charged that political culture was a static concept and that Almond and Verba had ethnocentrically asserted the (presumably permanent) superiority of Anglo-Saxon culture over that of other nations. For though their theoretical interests concerned possible changes in political culture, their analysis was based on data from a single time point and was therefore necessarily static. Empirically, the political culture of a given country could only be treated as a constant. The British and U.S. citizens were, as hypothesized, found to rank higher on interpersonal trust, pride in their political institutions, and feelings of political competence than the publics of Germany, Italy, or Mexico. But since these variables were in fact constants for each country, it was impossible to analyze their relationships with other macrophenomena or to trace changes over time.
The political culture literature argues that the evolution and persistence of mass-based democracy requires the emergence of certain supportive habits and attitudes among the general public. One of the most basic of these attitudes is a sense of interpersonal trust. Almond and Verba (1963) concluded that interpersonal trust is a prerequisite to the formation of secondary associations, which in turn is essential to effective political participation in any large democracy. A sense of trust is also required for the functioning of the democratic rules of the game: one must view the opposition as a loyal opposition, who will not imprison or execute you if you surrender political power but can be relied upon to govern within the laws and to surrender political power reciprocally if your side wins the next election. Almond and Verba found that their German and Italian respondents ranked relatively low on interpersonal trust. With data from only one time point it was impossible to determine whether these findings could be attributed to short-term factors-perhaps the harsh conditions of the post-war era-or whether they reflected more enduring differences. There was some reason to believe that the Italian findings, in particular, might reflect the heritage of long historical experiences (Banfield 1958) .
The relationship between (1) a culture of distrust and (2) the presence or absence of modem social structures has the causal ambiguity of the chicken-versus-egg question: Does southern Europe have low levels of trust because it has not yet developed modern organizational structures? Or (in a variation on Weber's protestant ethic thesis) did southern Europe industrialize and develop modem organizational structures later than northern Europe because its traditional culture was relatively low on interpersonal trust? We cannot answer this question conclusively with the data now available. Banfield's interpretation implies that low levels of trust are a persisting feature of given cultures or regional subcultures, which may inhibit economic and political development in those areas. His critics emphasize the impact of economic development on cultural patterns. In our view a reciprocal causal relationship seems likely.
Important though it is, interpersonal 1204 trust alone is not sufficient to support stable mass democracy. A long-term commitment to democratic institutions among the public is also required, in order to sustain democracy when conditions are dire. Even when democracy has no reply to the question, What have you done for me lately? it may be sustained by diffuse feelings that it is an inherently good thing. These feelings in turn may reflect economic and other successes that one experienced long ago or learned about second-hand as a part of one's early socialization. Evidence presented below indicates that the publics of certain societies have much more positive feeling toward the world they live in than do those of other societies. One of the best indicators of this orientation is satisfaction with one's life as a whole. This is a very diffuse attitude. It is not tied to the current performance of the economy or the authorities currently in office or to any specific aspect of society. Partly because it is so diffuse, intercultural differences in this orientation are remarkably enduring and may help shape attitudes toward more specific objects, such as the political system. From their 1959 fieldwork, Almond and Verba found that (unlike the British or U.S. citizens) few Germans expressed pride in their political institutions. But one of the few aspects of their society in which they did express pride was the way their economic system was working. In the short run, this is an inadequate basis for democratic legitimacy. But in the long run, such feelings may contribute to the evolution of broadly favorable orientations toward the institutions under which one lives. Such feelings may play an important role in sustaining the viability of these institutions even when favorable economic or political outputs are not forthcoming. For cultural patterns, once established, possess considerable autonomy and can influence subsequent political and economic events. To demonstrate this fact, let us now turn to the analysis of data from cross-national surveys carried out during the past 15 years.
Cross-cultural Differences in Overall Life Satisfaction and Their Political Significance
The study of political culture is based on the implicit assumption that autonomous and reasonably enduring crosscultural differences exist and that they can have important political consequences. Intuitively, these assumptions seem plausible. But critics of cultural explanations have questioned them, and indeed very little empirical evidence has been presented to support them so far. Since they are crucial assumptions underlying a controversial topic, let us examine a substantial body of evidence in order to see how well these assumptions hold up in longitudinal perspective.
I will start with one of the most basic and central attitudes of all: whether or not one is satisfied with the way things are going in one's life. through 1987 they rank last in every year but one (when they rank second-lowest); at no time during this fourteen-year period do more than 15% of the Italian public describe themselves as "very satisfied." The French manifest only slightly higher levels of life satisfaction than the Italians, ranking in second-to-last place in all but two years (rising one rank above this level in one year and falling one rank below it in the other year). At no time do more than 17% of the French public describe themselves as "very satisfied." At the opposite extreme, the Danes manifest the highest level of overall life satisfaction in every year but one (when they rank second); at no time do less than 47% of the Danish public describe themselves as "very satisfied." On the average, the Danes are six times as likely as the Italians to describe themselves as "very satisfied." The Dutch also rank high consistently, throughout the period from 1973 to 1987; at no time do less than 36% describe themselves as "very satisfied" with their lives as a whole.
The other nationalities maintain their relative positions in remarkably stable fashion, with a sole exception: the Belgians, who consistently ranked among the three most satisfied nationalities throughout the 1970s, show a substantial and protracted decline in the 1980s, falling to sixth place by 1986, In the 1970s, 40-45% of the Belgians consistently described themselves as "very satisfied"; in 1986, the figure had fallen to 21%. This drop of 15-20 points is not immense when compared with the gap of 50 points that separate the Danes from the Italians, but it does represent a substantial decline in the subjective well-being of the Belgian public and stands in dramatic contrast to the overall stability of the cross-national differences manifested throughout this period. The cultural differences are 1206 reasonably stable but not eternal. Shortterm fluctuations are present and, as the Belgian case illustrates, significant changes can occur in the relative positions of given nations.
On the whole, the stability shown in Figure 1 is truly remarkable. For one must bear in mind that this was a period of sharp economic upheavals; the crises that occurred in the mid-1970s and the early 1980s constituted the two most severe recessions since the 1930s. Moreover, these crises had a much more severe impact on some societies than others. From 1973 to 1987, life satisfaction declined significantly in both Belgium and Ireland, two of the three countries most severely afflicted by unemployment and inflation during this period. Conversely, life satisfaction showed a modest but perceptible upward trend in Germany, the country with the lowest inflation rates from 1973 to 1987. Thus I find a fairly good fit between short-term fluctuations in life satisfaction and the economic experiences of the respective societies.
But a far more impressive aspect of Figure 1 is the cultural continuity that persisted in spite of these short-term fluctuations. Despite dramatic economic upheavals from year to year and despite large differences between the experiences of the different countries, I find remarkable stability in the relative positions of these publics. Through thick and thin, the Italians and French remain near the bottom and the Danes and Dutch near the top. And despite the fact that the German economy ranks high both in absolute terms and in relative performance, the life satisfaction levels of the German public consistently rank relatively low. Conversely, both the Irish and the Dutch have much lower per capita incomes than the Germans, and they experienced considerably higher levels of inflation and unemployment during this era than the Germans did, yet they continued to manifest higher levels of life satisfaction than the Germans. Though cross-cultural differences in life satisfaction respond to economic changes, they do so only with a great deal of inertia.
My conclusion is very simple but very important: there is a durable cultural component underlying these responses. Virtually any survey response is influenced to some extent by the context in which it is asked and this question is no exception: responses reflect both shortterm fluctuations (resulting from immediate economic, social, and political events) and a long-term cultural component. Through statistical procedures it is possible to distinguish between the underlying cultural component and the short-term disturbances. In the present case, the long-term cultural differences are so pronounced that one can readily perceive them by mere visual inspection. Enduring cross-cultural differences exist and can be measured., I suggest that the cultural component of these cross-national differences reflects the distinctive historical experience of the respective nationalities. Long periods of disappointed expectations give rise to dissatisfied attitudes. These orientations may be transmitted from generation to generation through preadult socialization. In so far as early learning is relatively persistent, this contributes to the stability of distinctive cultural patterns. The fact that one can to some extent identify the historical causes of given cross-cultural differences does not of course make them disappear. They remain distinctive cultural characteristics with important behavioral consequences.
Is it true that economic security tends to enhance the prevailing sense of life satisfaction in a society, gradually giving rise to a relatively high cultural norm? Empirical evidence supports this supposition. First, as we have seen, there is a tendency for life satisfaction levels to rise or decline gradually in response to shortterm economic fluctuations. But one 
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Interpersonal Trust, Economic Development, and Democracy Following Banfield, Almond and Verba, Wylie, and others, I hypothesized that interpersonal trust is part of an enduring cultural syndrome that is conducive to the viability of democracy. The first question one must answer is, Do enduring intercultural differences exist in interpersonal trust? Unless they do, any argument concerning its long-term political impact is on shaky ground.
The evidence indicates that given societies are indeed characterized by distinctive levels of interpersonal trust. This even seems to be true of specific regions within given countries. Euro-Barometer surveys in 1976, 1980 and 1986 asked, "Now I would like to ask about how much you would trust people from various countries. For each country, please say whether, in your opinion, they are, generally very trustworthy, fairly trustworthy, not particularly trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy." Figure 3 depicts the relative levels of interpersonal trust expressed during this 10-year period toward people of one's own nationality. As is immediately evident, trust levels in given countries are extremely stable. In a pattern that is becoming increasingly familiar, the Italian public ranks lowest at every point in time (with four major regions of Italy each retaining its relative position). The Greeks rank next, followed by the French. The other nationalities are clustered close together, with relative rankings consistently remaining within the band between 85% and 95%. One line in Figure 3 Despite evidence of impressive stability in the propensity to trust others, trust is not a fixed genetic characteristic: it is cultural, shaped by the historical experiences of given peoples and subject to change. Fieldwork carried out for The Civic Culture found that the publics of the two long-established English-speaking democracies had markedly higher levels of interpersonal trust than those of Mexico, West Germany, or Italy. The Italian public, in particular, manifested trust levels that were phenomenally low in 1959. But as our theoretical framework implies, the economic miracles that took place in both West Germany and Italy during the 1950s and 1960s eventually had an impact on the political culture of these countries. Though the Italian public still remained relatively low on trust in 1981 and 1986, absolute levels of trust had more than tripled by 1981 and almost 1212 Data from Greece are available only since 1980, but they fit the pattern just described. To be sure, the Greek public has shown relatively high levels of satisfaction with the way democracy is functioning since democratic institutions were restored in the 1970s. But as I have already noted, this variable fluctuates with short-term events. On most of the long-term civic culture indicators such as life satisfaction, happiness, and support for the existing social order, the Greek public ranks relatively low. In keeping with this pattern, support for antisystem parties has been relatively high in Greece. The Communist vote has been higher than in any of the other societies for which time series data exist, apart from France and Italy; and there has also been significant support for parties of the extreme Right.
I believe that relatively low levels of diffuse satisfaction and trust make one more likely to reject the existing political system and support parties of the extreme Right or Left. Again, we have the chickenversus-egg question: Does a culture of dissatisfaction and distrust give rise to an extremist vote or do extremist parties produce distrust and dissatisfaction? The available empirical data do not allow me to provide a conclusive answer; but there change precedes changes in the vote. Table 1 shows the cross-national pattern of responses to the following question:
On this card (show card) are three basic kinds of attitudes concerning the kind of society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion.
1. The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action.
2. Our society must be gradually improved by reforms.
3. Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces.
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As Table 1 Such data are not now available and will be difficult to obtain, both because it will require a long-term data-gathering process in many countries during many decades and because the governments of nondemocratic societies usually make it difficult to carry out survey research. In principle, however, it is possible to acquire such data, and this is a goal worth striving for. We may not attain the optimum, but we can certainly improve on what we have now. In the meantime, let us examine the cross-national pattern: do democratic institutions seem to have emerged earlier and persisted longer in societies with high levels of overall life satisfaction, than in those characterized by relatively low levels? As Figure 5 demonstrates, the answer is yes. There is a remarkably consistent tendency for high levels of life satisfaction to go together with the persistence of democratic institutions over relatively long periods of time. Among the 24 societies depicted in Figure 5, Figures 2, 4 , and 5 are so striking and their implications are so important that they virtually cry out for further exploration. The remainder of this article will be devoted to some analyses that cannot be conclusive, but which suggest that cultural factors may play an extremely significant role in both political and economic development. I hope these analyses may stimulate further historical analysis and the development of the longitudinal data base necessary for any definitive analysis of the role of culture. 
Cultural Change and Economic Development
I have established that certain societies are characterized relatively strongly by a durable set of orientations that roughly corresponds to the "civic culture" discussed by Almond and Verba and that this cultural pattern shows a strong empirical linkage with stable democracy even when I control for related aspects of social structure and economic development. In other words, a body of evidence that not only is much larger than that available to Almond and Verba but also extends over a number of years tends to confirm the basic thesis of The Civic Culture.
But the civic culture itself is only one aspect of a still broader cultural syndrome that seems to reflect a long-term process of social and economic change. To understand this process, one must see it in the context of historical developments that have taken place over the past few centuries. Though we do not have survey data that would enable us to trace directly the long-term cultural changes linked with this process, some available indicators enable us at least to suggest the broad outlines of what has been happening. Max Weber (1958) argued at the turn of the century that the rise of capitalism and the subsequent rapid economic development of the West were made possible by a set of cultural changes related to the emergence of Calvinist Protestantism. His Protestant ethic thesis gave rise to a controversy that endured for decades. Some of the criticisms seem well founded; and the thesis that economic achievement was linked with Protestantism may seem unconvincing today, when predominantly Catholic countries have higher economic growth rates than Protestant ones. Nevertheless, though I would not defend Weber's thesis in its entirety, I believe that important aspects of it were correct, provided his work is viewed as an analysis of a specific historical phenomenon (as was clearly Weber's intention) and not as asserting an immutable relationship between economic achievement and Protestantism. Particularly crucial is Weber's insight that culture is not simply an epiphenomenon determined by economics but an autonomous set of factors that sometimes shape economic events as well as being shaped by them.
I utilize the dominant religious tradition of a given society as an indicator of its preindustrial cultural heritage. This is, of course, an oversimplified indicator, though not as oversimplified as it may seem from today's perspective. Contemporary social scientists tend to underestimate the historical importance of religion, both because they are social scientists, habituated to viewing the world from a secular and scientific viewpoint, and because they are contemporary and live in societies in which the functions of religion have diminished drastically. In most agrarian societies, religion is an overwhelmingly important force, filling the functions that educational and scientific institutions, the mass media, art museums, and philanthropic foundations, as well as religious institutions, now fill in advanced industrial societies. In modem societies, religion is a far less adequate indicator of the culture as a whole, which becomes more differentiated and subject to more rapid change. But my interest here is on the impact of the preindustrial cultural heritage of given societies. Though religion is only a rough indicator of this heritage, I use it for want of more refined measures of the value systems prevailing at given times and places in the past. cultural factors not only being influenced by economic change, but also influencing it. Weber argues that Calvinist Protestantism gradually evolved into a value system that viewed the accumulation of wealth for its own sake (and not as a means to survive or acquire luxuries) as a sign of divine grace and encouraged an ascetic self-control conducive to the accumulation of wealth. This led to an en--trepreneurial spirit and an accumulation of capital that facilitated the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which in turn had immense consequences for global economic development in the twentieth century.
I suggest that the Protestant Reformation was only one case of a more general phenomenon: the breakdown of traditional cultural barriers to economic modernization. For as the top half of Figure 7 suggests, one feature common to traditional value systems is that they emerge in, and are adapted to, economies characterized by very little technological change and economic growth. In this situation, social mobility is a zero-sum game, heavily laden with conflict and threatening to the social system. In a society undergoing rapid industrialization and expansion, by contrast, social mobility may be widespread. But in traditional agrarian societies, social status is hereditary, except when an individual or group forcibly seizes the lands and social status of another. To preserve social peace, virtually all traditional cultures discourage upward social mobility and the accumulation of wealth. These cultures perform an integrating function by providing a ra-1222 tionale that legitimates the established social order and inculcating norms of sharing, charity, and other obligations that help to mitigate the harshness of a subsistence economy.
By their very nature the traditional value systems of agrarian society are adapted to maintaining a stable balance in unchanging societies. Accordingly, they tend to discourage social change in general and the accumulative entrepreneurial spirit in particular. One of the important functions of the Protestant Reformation was to break the grip of the medieval Christian world view on a significant portion of Europe. It did not accomplish this alone. The emergence of scientific inquiry had already begun to undermine the anthropocentric cosmos of the medieval Christian tradition. But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Weber's emphasis on the role of Protestantism captures an important part of reality. For prior to the Protestant Reformation, southern Europe was economic--ally more advanced than northern Europe. During the three centuries after the Reformation, capitalism emerged, mainly among the Protestant regions of Europe and among the Protestant minorities of Catholic countries. Protestant Europe manifested a subsequent economic dynamism that was extraordinary, moving it far ahead of Catholic Europe. Shifting trade patterns, declining food production in southern Europe, and other variables played a role in this shift, but the evidence suggests that cultural factors were also important.
As capitalism led to industrialization and eventually to historically unprecedented levels of prosperity, emulation became more and more attractive, and increasing amounts of cross-cultural diffusion took place. But to a truly remarkable degree, throughout the early stages the Protestant cultural zone was markedly more receptive to industrialization and economic development than any other part of the world. The Industrial Revolution began in England, spreading rapidly to predominantly Protestant Scotland and Wales but leaving Catholic Ireland largely untouched except for the Protestant region around Belfast. Industrialization spread from England to nearby France but lagged there in comparison with its rapid implantation in more distant but more receptive areas such as the United States and Germany,, both of which soon became far more industrialized than France. At the start of the twentieth century, the correlation between Protestantism and economic development was still remarkably strong. In Europe, the economically most dynamic nations were Great Britain, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, and Switzerland, all of which were predominantly Protestant at that time. The only non-Protestant countries that had attained even roughly comparable levels of economic development were Belgium and France, both of which were geographically near the original core area from which the Industrial Revolution spread and in both of which Protestant minorities played a disproportionately important role in the process of economic development. In the New World, the United States and Canada had also emerged as developed industrial societies, while virtually all of Latin America remained almost totally unaffected by the Industrial Revolution. Even within Canada, the predominantly Catholic region developed much less rapidly than the rest of the country. Economic development seemed wedded to Protestantism.
But culture is not a constant. It is a system through which a society adapts to its environment. Given a changing environment, in the long run culture is likely to change. One major change that took place was the secularization of Catholic It is doing so unevenly, however, with its spread being shaped by the cultural traditions of given societies. The Confucian system was virtually unique among traditional cultures in that it institutionalized a socially accepted and even honored channel for upward social mobility, based on nonviolent individual achievement rather than ascription. By passing a series of difficult academic examinations that were open to any promising young male, one could attain power, status, and wealth as a government official. Consequently, in the sixteenth century a social scientist from Mars might have ranked East Asia, with its Confucian tradition, as the region of the world that was culturally most conducive to economic development. Though narrowly circumscribed, social mobility through individual achievement was accepted to a degree virtually unknown elsewhere. Education, rather than armed force, was the principal means to rise in society. 
Conclusion
Both social analysis and social policy would be much simpler if people from different societies were interchangeable robots. But a large body of evidence indicates that they are not. The peoples of given societies tend to be characterized by reasonably durable cultural attributes that sometimes have major political and economic consequences. If this is true, then effective social policy will be better 1228 served by learning about these differences and about how they vary cross-culturally and over time than by pretending that they don't exist.
Rational choice models constitute one of the most promising tools now available for political analysis. As currently applied, they are effective in analyzing short-term fluctuations within a given system, taking cultural and institutional factors as constant. But these factors are not constant, either cross-nationally or over time. And current models cannot deal with long-term changes in the basic goals and nature of a system. One of the central debates in the field of political economy seems to reflect this fact. When it was found that political support responded to fluctuations in the economy, it was taken for granted that this reflected the workings of economic self-interest among the electorate. Subsequent research has made this interpretation increasingly doubtful. The linkage between economics and politics seems largely shaped by sociotropic concerns. The classic model of economically determined behavior has a strong grip on the minds of social analysts, probably because, throughout most of the history of industrial society, it provided a fairly accurate description of human behavior. In recent decades, the rising role of postmaterialist concerns may have helped make sociotropic concerns increasingly important, particularly among the politically more aware segments of the electorate.
Political economy research has demonstrated convincingly that short-term economic changes have significant political consequences. But the long-term consequences of economic change have barely begun to be analyzed in comparable fashion, though they may be at least equally significant. Evidence presented here indicates that the emergence and viability of mass-based democracy is closely related to economic development and that the outcome is contingent on specific cultural changes. Though mass democracy is almost impossible without a certain amount of economic development, economic development by itself does not produce democracy. Unless specific changes occur in culture and social structure, the result may not be democracy but a variety of alternatives ranging from the Libyan to the Soviet. A large body of cross-national survey evidence indicates that enduring cultural differences exist. Though these differences may be related to the economic level of a given nation, they are relatively independent of short-term economic changes. These cultural factors have an important bearing on the durability of democracy, which seems to result from a complex interplay of economic, cultural, and institutional factors. To neglect any of these components may compromise its survival.
Finally, it appears that economic development itself is influenced by cultural variables. In my brief analysis of this, I have utilized one indicator of materialist and postmaterialist values that is available from only the past two decades and another indicator-the dominant religious or philosophic tradition of a given society-that is a greatly oversimplified indicator of prevailing worldviews at a given time and place but goes back over centuries. Clearly, this analysis cannot be regarded as conclusive. But the available evidence tends to confirm Weber's insight that culture is not just a consequence of economics but can shape the basic nature of economic and political life. Note 1. These findings, incidentally, bear on a question that was recently considered grounds for denying Samuel Huntington membership in the National Academy of Sciences. His opponents charged that it was absurd to argue that relatively high or low levels of satisfaction can be attributed to given nations; but in a very significant sense, it appears that they can.
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